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NOTES
LABOR UNION BANKRUPTCY*
Labor relations is extra-legal and draws water only in part from the
deep well of judicial experience. It is broader and is derived from the
totality of the economic and social environment. As it adapts, adjusts and
uses the resources of our society, it survives, and, as it fails to do so, the
industrial society dependent upon it suffers. Ancient precepts suited to the
needs of another age, therefore, cannot be strictured into the needs of the
developing industrial society of this fast fading century.'
Society's image of the labor union as a powerful, economic force2
initially creates doubt as to the likelihood of union bankruptcy. Even
the more sophisticated observer finds local union liabilities inconse-
quential when compared to assets.3 Conservative investments, moti-
vated primarily by a desire to keep assets liquid in case of the need for
payment of strike benefits, typically characterize union financial poli-
cies.4 At least on the face of the balance sheet, bankruptcy is unlikely
for the union that maintains customary financial practices.
* After this Note went to press, The Eighth Circuit held that a union was a "person" enti-
tied to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Freight Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon Transps., Inc.,
576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978). The court's reasoning is in many respects similar to that contained
herein.
1. Kaynard, Book Review, 37 FoP DHAM L. REv. 502, 508 (1969).
2. "In many instances [unions] have become far more powerful than the employers with
whom they do business. Today most observers would agree. . . 'the strongest unions. . . are the
most powerful economic organizations which the country has ever seen."' Goldberg, AFL-CIO,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Associ-
ATION 45-46 (1956) (statement of general counsel of the United States Chamber of Commerce).
See generally UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Bartell, National Union Assets,
1959-1961, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 80 (1965).
3. Applebaum, Local Union Financial Structure: 1962-1966, 22 LAB. L.J. 713, 718, 724
(1971). The author conducted a survey of wisconsin locals and reported his findings in a series of
articles. In an earlier piece, he asserted that the assets/liabilities ratio of the surveyed locals was
approximately 20:1. Applebaum, 4n Analysis ofthe Financial Structure of Local Labor Unions, 16
LAB. L.J. 164, 173 (1965). See also Applebaum, A Regional Analysis o/Local Union Financial
Structures, 17 LAB. L.J. 353, 355, 360 (1966); Bartell, supra note 2.
4. Applebaum, Financial Structure and Characteristics of Labor Organizations in a Metro-
politan Area, 15 LAB. L.J. 30, 40 (1964). The author notes that union securities investments are
generally in the form of government issues. Aside from the greater degree of security in govern-
ment obligations, unions refrain from corporate investments to avoid possible conflicts of interest.
The unions feel bargaining with a corporation in which they invest is bargaining against itself;
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Generalities, 5 however, do not reflect the risk of fiscal insolvency
caused by the union's recently acquired legal status. Federal laws now
expose the labor union to suit6 and, consequently, to judgments that the
otherwise financially sound organization may be unable to satisfy.7 If
the judgment creditor insists on diverting members' dues to satisfy his
judgment, the union may be unable to operate effectivelyf In this situ-
ation, a discharge in bankruptcy may be the union's only means of
survival.9
The threshold question, and one of first impression, is whether the
union is a "person" entitled to the benefits of bankruptcy."t Although
Congress included the "unincorporated association" as a "person"
amenable to adjudication,1 both the case law construing the term and
the union's unique legal and functional status necessitate closer scru-
whereas, investing in a corporation with which they do not bargain may not be in the workers'
best interests. Id.
5. There are unions and unions. We have locals, nationals, and federations; craft,
industrial, and multi-craft or multi-industrial; conservative and radical; large and small;
blue-collar and white-collar, democratic and dictatorial.
[D]ifferent conditions promote divergences in behavior and policy. Consequently, theo-
rizing about unions is hampered by many variables and an abundance of variation.
Lester, The Changing Nature of the Union, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIR-
TEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 19 (1960).
6. See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Motor Carriers Council of St. Louis, Inc. v. Local 600, Teamsters Union, 384 F.
Supp. 214 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 516 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. Cf Comment, The Property Rights of Disaffiliating Local Unions in the Light of Public
Policy, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 252, 259 (1969) (inability of local to function effectively on rever-
sion of assets to international upon disaffiliation). See generally G.F. BLOOM & H.R. NORTHRUP,
ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 119, 120 (1965): "Operating a union in modem American soci-
ety is an expensive undertaking. Officer and employee salaries, office rent, traveling expenses,
postage and other communication expenses, publicity, and legal and research activities are some
of the daily routine expenses which must be met."
9. The Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970) reads: "'Discharge' shall mean the
release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are
excepted by this title.'
10. The issue was recently resolved by the Eighth Circuit in Freight Drivers Local 600 v.
Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978), rel'gln re Freight Drivers Local 600,432 F.
Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977). Local 600 filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy after suffering
judgments totaling approximately six million dollars in suits brought by more than 60 motor carri-
ers injured by the union's breach of a no-strike clause in an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. The bankruptcy court's opinion noted that at least one other labor organization had filed a
voluntary petition and obtained a discharge. But the bankruptcy was not challenged, and there
was no reported decision in the case. In re Freight Drivers Local 600, No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 13
n.9 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 1, 1976) (noting Carpenters Local 930, No. 6-73-1062 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 1975)),
rev'd, 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Freight Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon
Transps., Inc., 576 F. 2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978).
11. See notes 21-26 infra and accompanying text.
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tiny of the issue. Beyond the initial statutory interpretation, moreover,
lies the inevitable conflict between two comprehensive legislative
schemes, the Bankruptcy Act' 2 and the National Labor Relations Act.'3
This Note isolates, through several case analyses, the common char-
acteristics of entities previously adjudicated as "unincorporated as-
sociations." The next section examines the union's personality,
emphasizing those qualities which correspond to the bankruptcy crite-
ria. Section III integrates the information discerned from the two prior
sections, concluding that the union qualifies as a voluntary bankrupt,
and discusses the major issues likely to arise from union bankruptcy.
I. THE UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION IN BANKRUPTCY
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act'4 is to stabilize the relationship
between an insolvent, nonpaying, or fraudulent debtor and his credi-
tors.' 5 The Act provides voluntary' 6 and involuntary 7 methods of ad-
judication. The honest debtor may discharge his indebtedness through
a voluntary petition and secure "a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of pre-existing debt."' 8 Creditors may bring involuntary petitions
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
14. For a discussion of the historical antecedents of American bankruptcy law and an analy-
sts of the legislative debate preceding enactment, see C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1935); Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223
(1918).
15. See In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, 494 (1874). See also United States v. Bekins, 304
U.S. 27, 47 (1938); Adair v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 354 (1938);
Continental Ill. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935);
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902). See generally Countryman, A History of
American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226 (1976); Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy. Prevention of
Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REv. 373 (1937); Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
16. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 4.03, at 579 (14th ed. 1974). A voluntary
petition is a debtor's ex parte application which, upon filing, results in his automatic adjudication
as a bankrupt. See Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1970).
17. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 4.14, at 608 (14th ed. 1974). Involuntary
petitions are generally filed by creditors to protect their interests in the debtors remaining assets.
Because an involuntary petition must allege that the debtor commited an act of bankruptcy, see
Bankruptcy Act § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1970), and, except for debtors who are natural persons, is
limited to business entities, see notes 27-28 infra and accompanying text, it is a far less common
means of adjudication. See D. COwANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1051, at 583-84
(1963). This Note does not reach the question of whether a union is subject to involuntary
bankruptcy.
18. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See, ag., In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972
(6th Cir.), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1968);
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against qualifying debtors and thus enjoy the protection of a court su-
pervised distribution of the debtor's property. 9 Post adjudication pro-
cedures are similar under both voluntary and involuntary petitions.
20
Section 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act entitles any "person," except four
specified corporations, to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.21 The
statute22 defines "person" to include "corporations" 23 which, in turn, is
defined to include
all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations
not possessed by individuals or partnerships and shall include partnership
associations organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone
responsible for the debts of the association, joint-stock companies, unin-
corporated companies and associations, and any business conducted by a
trustee or trustees wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced
by certificate or other written instrument.24
The statutory "corporation" is thus significantly broader than is ordi-
narily recognized 25 outside of bankruptcy court and judicial construc-
tion varies substantially with the factual and historical context of the
organization.26
Hartman v. Utley, 335 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1964); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 216
F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 963 (1955); State Fin. Co. v. Morrow, 216 F.2d 676
(10th Cir. 1954); In re Pacific Automation Prods., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Cal. 1964); In re
Wesley Corp., 18 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
19. See Wolfe, The Bankruptcy Law and Its Economic Necessity, 4 TEMP. L.Q. 218, 219-20
(1930).
20. D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 882, at 465 (1963).
21. Bankruptcy Act § 4(a), I1 U.S.C. 22(a) (1970) reads: "Any person, except a municipal,
railroad, insurance, or banking corporation or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to
the benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt."
22. Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), defines words and phrases for the
express purpose of use throughout the Act. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4.06, at 601 (14th
ed. 1974).
23. Bankruptcy Act § l(a)(23), 11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1970) reads: "'Persons' shall include cor-
porations, except where otherwise specified ... " Even without the statutory definition as a
guide, "persons" should be interpreted as including corporations because § 4(a) excludes certain
corporations implying that corporations not within the excepted class are included. Further, only
"natural persons" are subject to involuntary bankruptcy under § 4(b), 11 U.S.C, § 22(b) (1970),
indicating a broader use of the word in § 4(a). See De Funiak, Right of Unincorporated Companies
or Assoc/ations to File Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy, A-I CORP. REORO. 336 (1938).
24. Bankruptcy Act § l(a)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970) (emphasis added).
25. See Kresberg v. International Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 764 (1945); In re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F.2d 769, 771 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
757 (1944); Colin, An Analysis ofthe 1926Amendments to the BankruptcyAct, 26 COLUM. L. REV.
789, 790 (1926). But see E. WARREN, COR'ORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 570
(1929).
26. Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d 132, 134 (Ist Cir. 1941).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/4
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The class of debtors eligible for involuntary bankruptcy is more re-
stricted than the class eligible for voluntary adjudication. Congress in-
cluded specific limitations to protect the nonqualifying,
ie., noncommercial, debtor from the social stigma which accompanies
involuntary adjudication.27 But spurious limitations have developed
from an inartistic and awkward legislative history. Prior to 1926, sec-
tion 4(b) permitted creditors to petition for the involuntary adjudica-
tion of "[a]ny natural person, .... any unincorporated company, and
any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation ... 28 At that
time, the "unincorporated company" was the only unincorporated en-
tity included in the Act because "unincorporated companies and as-
sociations" were not within the original definition of "corporation and
were, therefore, not persons at all."2 9 Section 4(b) "corporations" ex-
pressly required a business purpose30 and some courts applied the same
limitation to the "unincorporated company."3 In re Tidewater Coal
Exchange32 presented the question of whether Congress' use of the
word "company" in section 4(b) supported this implication.
The Tidewater Coal Exchange was established by individuals, corpo-
rations, and partnerships during the First World War to expedite the
transfer of coal from rail to ship; it was unincorporated, had no capital,
and expenses were paid entirely by the shippers.33 It maintained a pool
of coal, crediting members' accounts when coal was received and debit-
ing those accounts when coal was shipped on their consignment. The
Exchange became insolvent when the pool did not contain enough coal
to answer the claims of all members.34 Creditors subsequently filed a
petition to have the Exchange adjudicated bankrupt.
27. Involuntary bankruptcy is often the creditor's last resort, motivated primarily by a fear
that either the debtor is dishonest or incapable of handling imminent financial difficulties. D.
COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRAcrICE § 1051, at 584 (1963).
28. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4(b), 36 Stat. 839.
29. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § l(a)(6), 30 Stat. 544; note 40 infra and accompanying
text.
30. One commentator has suggested that Congress "thought that corporations which were
unconcerned with money, business or commerce should not have their laudable activities dis-
rupted by liquidation at the instance of pestiferous creditors." Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy
Act: The Excluded Corporations, 42 MINN. L. REv. 171, 232 (1957).
31. See, e.g., In re Minnesota Ins. Underwriters, 36 F.2d 371 (D. Minn. 1929); Gallagher v.
Hannigan, 5 F.2d 171, 175 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 573 (1925) (business trust); In re Order
of Sparta, 242 F. 235, 238 (3d Cir. 1917) (fraternal benefit association); In re Parker, 275 F. 868,
870 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 283 F. 404 (7th Cir. 1921) (business trust).
32. 274 F. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), afftd, 280 F. 638 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 584 (1922).
33. 280 F. at 640-41.
34. 274 F. at 1009.
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Washington University Open Scholarship
346 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Objectors to the petition argued that the Exchange was not subject to
involuntary adjudication because the term "company" in section 4(b)
included only those associations organized for a business or profit-
making purpose.35 In the district court, Judge Learned Hand refused to
reach the ultimate question because he believed the members' pursuit
of commercial "advantages" was sufficient to satisfy any such implied
limitation.36 Hand also rejected arguments that an association must
otherwise be recognized as a legal person to fall within the Act's "unin-
corporated company." The legal relations between the members them-
selves, or with respect to outsiders, he found irrelevant to the court's
power to dispose of the debtor's assets through bankruptcy.37
On appeal, the Second Circuit adopted the same position, holding it
sufficient that the Exchange was an association of individuals pursuing
a common business objective, and finding it unnecessary to decide
whether an unincorporated company without some commercial pur-
pose could be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt.38 The court held
that the Exchange possessed a corporate character not common to indi-
viduals or partnerships because it operated "under a control agreed to
by all its members," and was capable of incurring debt although it was
not organized for profit. 39
Because only business entities were otherwise subject to involuntary
petitions, it was not wholly irrational for courts to imply a business
purpose requirement in the word "company." Yet the Act expressly
required that only "corporations," and not "unincorporated com-
pan[ies]," be "moneyed, business, or commercial" in purpose. The ar-
gument should have become moot when, in 1926, Congress responded
to the courts' constructional dilemma by inserting the words "unincor-
porated companies and associations" in the Act's "corporation"
definition. 40 Logic would have Congress including "association" in the
35. Id. at 1010.
36. Id. at 1011.
37. [The relations between the members are one thing, and means of winding up the
joint venture another. It needs no change in the legal relations between the mem-
bers-internally among themselves, or collectively against outsiders--to give a court
power to take over the joint assets... and finally to dissolve the association. Nor would
that be outside the scope of. . . bankruptcy ....
Id. at 1010.
38. 280 F. at 643.
39. Id. Cf. In re South Shore Co-op. Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1933) (Bank-
ruptcy Act says nothing about "profits"I in connection with the requirements of "business"
corporation).
40. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 1, 44 Stat. 662. See 67 CoNG. REC. 7675 (1926) (remarks
[Vol. 1978:341
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new definition to encompass nonbusiness entities. The unincorporated
company or association thus became a possible voluntary or involun-
tary bankrupt as a statutory "corporation." If the proceedings were in-
voluntary, the unincorporated "corporation," whether company or
association, was required to have a "moneyed, business, or commer-
cial" purpose.
Instead of alleviating the courts' constructional difficulties, however,
the change in the "corporation" definition initially led to confusion in
the involuntary context,4 which later spread to voluntary proceedings
and continues to plague even modem cases.42 The "corporation,"
which then included "unincorporated companies and associations," ex-
pressly required a "moneyed, business, or commercial" purpose in or-
der to be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt; the "unincorporated
company" that remained within section 4(b) did not.43 Because there
was no clear difference between the terms, petitioners seeking the in-
voluntary adjudication of noncommercial unincorporated organiza-
tions alleged that "unincorporated company" did not compel a
business purpose." Confronted with this anomalous result, courts fash-
ioned questionable statutory analyses to hold, correctly, that only com-
mercial organizations were subject to involuntary bankruptcy.45
Although the Chandler Act46 eliminated this difficulty by omitting the
"unincorporated company" from section 4(b), courts were reluctant to
digress from prior interpretation. Stare decisis compounded the prob-
lem as courts, relying solely on precedent, neglected to acknowledge
of Rep. Michener); Report of the Special Committee on Practice in Bankruptcy Matters, 50 REP.
A.B.A. 478, 481 (1925) ("There is at present doubt or uncertainty under judicial construction
whether the existing definition of corporations includes unincorporated companies, associations
and common-law trusts.. . which should be removed, as it is by the proposed amendment."). See
alo Luberger, Improvements in the Bankruptcy Act and Its Administration, 10 IowA L. BULL. 209
(1925); Robinson, The Scope and Effect of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 12 COR-
NELL L.Q. 49 (1926).
41. The inclusion of "unincorporated companies and associations" was "likely to be more
confusing than helpful" because of their amorphous legal status. See McLaughlin, Amendment of
the BankruptcyAct, 40 HARV. L. REy. 341, 355-65 (1927).
42. See notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text.
43. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. Cf. In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1937)
(eleemosynary association); In re William McKinley Lodge, 4 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (ma-
sonic lodge); In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (golf club).
45. See, e.g., In re Lloyds, 43 F.2d 383 (N.D. Tex. 1930); In re Minnesota Ins. Underwriters,
36 F.2d 371 (D. Minn. 1929), noted in 30 COLUM. L. REv. 401 (1930).
46. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 4(b), 52 Stat. 845 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 4(b)
(1970)). See Republic Underwriters v. Ford, 100 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1938); 25 VA. L. REv. 731
(1939).
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changes in the statute.47
In In re Philadelphia Consistory, the court, carefully examining the
statutory scheme, distinguished involuntary proceedings and held that
the absence of a business purpose did not bar voluntary adjudication.4 8
The Consistory was an unincorporated fraternal association which
gave financial aid and support to those of its members in need.4 9 The
petition in bankruptcy alleged that the Consistory's powers and privi-
leges resembled those of a corporation:
It is an association of more than seven thousand men, has a common
name; has a constitution and bylaws; it elects governing trustees; it has
powers to own real estate and personal property, and does so own them, it
has power to sue and be sued; it acts by its trustees, who are elected as a
single body.50
Despite these corporate characteristics,5" counsel seeking to dismiss the
voluntary petition argued that the term "corporation," as used in the
Act, related solely to organizations whose liability was limited to the
capital subscribed52 and contemplated, therefore, only business or com-
mercial enterprises. 3
The court's opinion emphasized the distinction between the Act's
47. One court disregarded the references to statutory definition altogether, see In re Manu-
facturing Lumbermen's Underwriters, 18 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Mo. 1936), and was subsequently
severely criticized. See In re Philadelphia Consistory Sublime Princes Royal Secret 320 Ancient
Accepted Scottish Rite, 40 F. Supp. 645,648 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (quoting I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
4.06, at 601-02 (14th ed. 1974)).
In Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d 132, 136 (lst Cir. 1941), the court
questioned whether the words "and associations" added anything to the phrase "unincorporated
companies." The latter, the court noted, was limited to business enterprises. Beyond the context of
an involuntary proceeding, this court's dicta is potentially damaging. See Associated Cemetery
Mgmt., Inc. v. Barnes, 268 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1959); In re Freight Drivers Local 600, 432 F. Supp.
1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'dsub nonm Freight Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.
2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978); notes 61-70 infra and accompanying text.
48. 40 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1941), aff'dper cur/am, 134 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1943).
49. Id. at 646.
50. Id.
51. See generally R. STEVENs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3, at
14 (2d ed. 1949).
52. Section 1(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970), defines "corporation" to
include those 'partnership associations organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone
responsible for the debts of the association. . . ." (emphasis added). Unincorporated associations
are also within the Act's definition, see text accompanying note 24 supra, but without
qualification. Capital subscription, therefore, is meant only to distinguish this particular kind of
partnership from those which do not afford partners limited liability, and for which the Act pro-
vides other methods of adjudication. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 5(a), (b), (c), I I U.S.C. §§ 23(a), (b),
(c) (1970).
53. 40 F. Supp. at 646-47.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/4
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section 4(a) voluntary, and section 4(b) involuntary, proceedings.5 4
Only a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation" was subject to
involuntary adjudication; the nature of a voluntary petitioner such as
the Consistory, however, was immaterial." The court reasoned that the
Consistory's character was indistinguishable from the country club,56
fraternal lodge,57 and eleemosynary association58 previously held to be
amenable to the Act, and denied the petition to dismiss the voluntary
adjudication. 9
What emerged from In re Philadelphia Consistory as a reasonable
distinction between voluntary and involuntary "corporations" was
blurred by the opinion in Associated Cemetery Management, Inc. v.
Barnes (ACMI) .60 A majority of the trustees of an employee profit
sharing trust fund petitioned to have it adjudicated a voluntary bank-
rupt. Several other trustees objected, contending that the trust was not a
"person" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.61 Because the
trust specifically prohibited the issuance of "anything of present ex-
changeable value" and thus failed to satisfy the Act's business trust cri-
teria,62 petitioners resorted to adjudication as an "unincorporated
54. The issue in the instant case has been obscured by the mistaken direction of atten-
tion on the part of counsel to the scope of section 4, sub. b rather than that of section 4,
sub. a which is the pertinent and controlling section.
There is a sharp line of demarcation between the scope of these two sections, because
of the numerous qualifying provisions in section 4, sub. b which are absent in section 4,
sub. a.
In short, certain "corporations"... which may file voluntary petitions, are excluded
from the operation of involuntary proceedings.
Id. at 647-48.
55. Id.
56. See In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
57. See In re Carthage Lodge 365, I.O.O.F., 230 F. 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1916). The Carthage
Lodge was a fraternal benefit association of Odd Fellows organized under the laws of New York
State. The statute enabled the lodge to enjoy the status of an entity that could hold and convey
property, sue and be sued, and incur and be held liable for its debts. It had power to elect trustees,
to manage its affairs, and to make rules and regulations governing the same. The court in Philadel-
phia Consistory recognized the similarities between the two associations in both purpose and sta-
tus. 40 F. Supp. at 649-50.
58. See In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1937).
59. 40 F. Supp. at 650.
60. 268 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1959).
61. Id. at 98-99.
62. Id. at 101-02. Congress added Massachusetts or business trusts to the Act's "corpora-
tion" definition in the 1926 amendments. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 1, 44 Stat. 662. See text
accompanying note 24 supra. Congress was merely codifying what the courts had previously
found to be implied. See 67 CONG. REc. 7675 (1926) (remarks of Rep. Michener). See also Gal-
lagher v. Hannigan, 5 F.2d 171 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 573 (1925); In re Parker, 275 F.
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association."6 3 The court rejected this contention and found that the
trust was not a "person" within the Act's definition because it was not a
"moneyed, business, or commercial corporation."'
The court's reasoning is questionable in a number of respects. First,
after noting that unincorporated entities were logically within the scope
of section 4(a), the court defined "unincorporated associations" by us-
ing decisions that construed section 4(b). Courts, in these decisions, re-
quired both the characteristics of an unincorporated association and
section 4(b)'s business purpose.65 InA CMI, the court ignored Philadel-
phia Consistory and mistakenly required a showing of business purpose
for the adjudication of any unincorporated association, including those
within section 4(a). Second, in response to appellant's criticism of the
court's misplaced reliance on precedent, the opinion purported to
acknowledge the distinction between voluntary and involuntary bank-
rupts, but asserted nevertheless that it relied primarily on a case that
did not limit its definition of an association to involuntary proceed-
ings. 66 Finally, although the court observed that the trustees engaged in
business, it refused to attribute their activities to the trust itself.67
ACMI may be correct on its facts. Congress arguably intended to
exclude from bankruptcy any trust entity which did not issue
certificates or other evidence of beneficial ownership to its members. 68
868 (N.D. Ill.), rev'don other grounds, 283 F. 404 (7th Cir. 1921); In re Associated Trust, 222 F.
1012 (D. Mass. 1914). See also Cook, An Analysis ofthe Amendatory Bankruptcy Law of 1926, 2
AM. BANKR. RaV. 324, 324 (1926) (amendment "to include, beyond doubt, commercial or busi-
ness trusts').
63. 268 F.2d at 102.
64. Id. at 104.
65. Id. at 102-03 (citing Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F.2d 171 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
573 (1925); In re Minnesota Ins. Underwriters, 36 F.2d 371 (D. Minn. 1929)).
66. Id. at 103-04. Did the court mean to suggest that the earlier opinion should have contem-
plated another court's subsequent misuse of its holding? The court's statutory misconstruction was
not wholly unpredictable. The earlier case, Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d
132 (1st Cir. 1941), involved a trust entity similar to the employees' profit sharing trust at issue in
ACCM!. The ACMI court logically relied on Pope & Cottle to support its finding that the employ-
ees' trust was not a business trust because it failed to issue evidence of beneficial ownership. 268
F.2d at 102. But to the extent ACMI relied on Pope & Cottle's involuntary proceedings to require
a business purpose of voluntary petitioners, it should be overruled. See note 47 supra.
67. 268 F.2d at 104. Query whether directors' activities are attributable to the corporation.
Cf. R. STEVENS, supra note 5 1, § 143, at 647 (directors act as "medium for the transaction of the
ordinary corporate business"). The court's failure to determine whether the trust was a body en-
dowed with "any of the powers and the privileges of private corporations not possessed by indi-
viduals or partnerships"--characteristics of the Act's "corporations"- was also questionable, See
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1218, 1221 (1960); text accompanying note 24 supra.
68. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRupTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/4
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Because of a trust's peculiar characteristics and the potential difficulty
of administering its bankrupt estate, this interpretation may be cor-
rect.69 It does, moreover, provide the only rational basis for the court's
otherwise spurious view of the "persons" entitled to voluntary
adjudication.
From the holdings in Tidewater and Philadelphia Consistory, and by
limitingACMl to its facts, the nature of the unincorporated association
entitled to the benefits of section 4(a) is cognizable. An entity eligible
for voluntary bankruptcy maintains a concentration of managerial con-
trol, the power to own and convey property, the capacity to sue and be
sued, and an ability to incur debts, all in its own name.70 In the absence
of these characteristics, courts hold members severally liable,7 expos-
ing personal assets to the group's creditors and requiring, if bankruptcy
remains feasible, individual adjudications.
II. THE LABOR UNION'S ENTITY STATUS
Although no one today would compare the labor union's effective
powers with those of a fraternal order or church,72 the common law
equates their legal status by categorizing them as unincorporated as-
sociations.73 The common law thus regards the labor organization as an
aggregate of individuals,74 and requires that all members be joined for
H.R. Doe. No. 137 (Part II), 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2, 7 (1973). Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 1-
102(13) eliminates the present Act's requirement of evidence of beneficial ownership by including
any "business trust" within the definition of a "corporation." The explanatory note, citing Pope &
Cottle, indicates that courts are expected to "give heed to the canon of ejusdem generis."
69. See 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1218, 1223-24 nn.36-41 (1960).
70. See text accompanying notes 39, 50-51 supra.
71. See McLaughlin, supra note 41, at 357-58 (because the ultimate effect of bankruptcy is
the distribution of assets among creditors, the liability of the individuals comprising the organiza-
tion is of utmost importance).
72. See Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 610
(1959).
73. See Comment, Unions as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 713 (1957); 27 ORE. L.
REV. 248 (1948). See generally A. LLOYD, UNINCORPOKrAED AssocIATIONS (1938). Although a
friend of labor suggested incorporation as a means of enforcing union rights, see Brandeis, The
lncorporation of Trade Unions, 15 GREEN BAG 11 (1902), union leaders believed the benefits were
outweighed by the threat of constant litigation. See Roberts, Labor Unions, Corporations-The
Coronado Case, 5 ILL. L.Q. 200, 200-01 (1923). This reluctance has been shared by other unincor-
porated associations. See R. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 205
(1936). See generally E. LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR (1950) (historically, unions faced
an unsympathetic judiciary and had few legal resources at their disposal).
74. Unions, because they are unincorporated associations, "are not persons, have no person-
ality; they are bodies unincorporate, bodies--the thought is charmingly English-which are bodi-
less." See Laski, The Personality ofAssociations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404, 407 (1916).
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the union to sue or be sued.75 The doctrine of estoppel,76 or, in equity,
the representative or class action initially allowed the courts to mitigate
this common law joinder requirement.7 Suability alone, however, did
not afford the union the rights and duties enjoyed by other legal per-
sons.78 For example, a corporation is bound by an agent who acts
within the scope of his employment;79 whereas the union is bound only
if each member has authorized the officer's action. 0 The union's cur-
rent juridical status stems from state laws that place greater responsibil-
ity on unincorporated associations,' and from legislation specifically
75. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union 125, 150 F. 155 (E.D. Wis. 1906),
modfled on other grounds, 166 F. 45 (8th Cir. 1908); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers'
Unions 1 & 3, 90 F. 598 (N.D. Ohio 1898); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 206
Ala. 196, 89 So. 435 (1921); Baskins v. UMW, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921); Johnston v.
Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931); UMW v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891 (1914);
Forest City Mfg. Co. v. ILGWU, 233 Mo. App. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934 (1938); Mitch v. UMW, 87
W. Va. 119, 104 S.E. 292 (1920). See S. WRIGHTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED As-
SOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS 425 (2d ed. 1923); Chafee, The InternalAffairs ofAssociations
Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930); Rice, Collective Labor.4greements inAnerican Law,
44 HARv. L. REV. 572 (1931); Sturges, Unincorporated,4ssociations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE
LU. 383 (1924); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1051
(1951).
76. See, e.g., Fields v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 60 Ill. App. 258 (1895) (union held itself
out as a corporation; contrary result would work undue hardship); Nissen v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941) (union which entered into contract for members
estopped from denying status as against wrongfully expelled member); Clark v. Grand Lodge of
RR. Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W.2d 404 (1931) (contracting union estopped from denying
contract obligations). See also Forest City Mfg. Co. v. ILGWU Local 104, 233 Mo. App. 935, 111
S.W.2d 934 (1938) (dictum) (if unincorporated association elects to do business as an entity, it may
be estopped from subsequent denial).
77. In UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), Chief Justice Taft, for the Court,
stated-
[E]quitable procedure adopting itself to modern needs has grown to recognize the need
of representation by one person of many, too numerous to sue or be sued. . . and this
has had its influence upon the law side of litigation, so that, out of the very necessities of
the existing conditions and the utter impossibility of doing justice otherwise, the suable
character of such an organization as [the UMW] has come to be recognized ....
Id. at 387. For a discussion of the Coronado case, see notes 83-91 infra and accompanying text.
78. See Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Unions, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 1, 1
(1954).
79. See R. STEVENS, supra note 51, §§ 164-65, at 767.
80. See, e.g., Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951), noted in 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 814 (1952).
81. The statutes are collected in Forkosch, supra note 78, at 7. The author notes that the lack
of uniformity from state to state often leads to anomalous results. One state may allow suit for any
purpose while a neighboring state may not; a third state may only permit suit to protect a union
trademark while still another may allow suit against the entity but permit judgment satisfaction
only against the members. Id. at 4.
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designed to protect union organizational activities.8 2
In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 3 the Supreme Court
held the union liable in its own name for its agents' acts in the course of
a violent strike.84 Although treble damage liability was premised on the
Sherman Act's application to "associations," 5 Chief Justice Taft re-
ferred to the statute only to confirm the union's amenability to suit,
which he rested on the independent ground8 6 that recent legislation
granting unions rights and duties, impliedly, if not explicitly, also made
them legal persons.87 The Chief Justice concluded that it would be
anomalous to allow the entity to escape responsibility and to hold the
members individually liable when, in fact, they had "voluntarily, and
for the purpose of acquiring concentrated strength. . . , created a self-
82. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1970)), legalized labor unions and labor combinations. Other statutes gave unions the right to sue
to enjoin infringement of the union label or trademark and made its wrongful use an offense.
Some states also outlawed the unauthorized use of union cards or insignias. In addition, many
states authorized a labor representative to appear at arbitration and before labor boards. These
statutes are cited extensively in UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 386 n.l (1922). See
also Cole, The Civil Suability, at Law, of Labor Unions, 8 FoRDHAM L. REV. 29, 32-33 rn.17-19
(1939).
83. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
84. Id. at 391.
85. See Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210.
[Unions] are, as has been abundantly shown [by the statutes cited], associations existing
under the laws of the United States,. . . and of the States of the Union. Congress was
passing drastic legislation to remedy a threatening danger to the public welfare, and did
not intend that any person or combinations of persons should escape its application.
Their thought was especially directed against business associations and combinations
that were unincorporated to do the things forbidden by the act, but they used language
broad enough to include all associations which might violate its provisions. . . ; and
this, of course, includes labor unions ....
259 U.S. at 392.
86. Compare Magill & Magill, The Suability of Labor Unions, 1 N.C.L. REv. 81, 84-86
(1922) (holding not based solely on the Sherman Act), with A. LLOYD, supra note 73, at 161-63
(holding rests on Sherman Act).
87. 259 U.S. at 391-92. See Comment, supra note 73, at 721. The Comment draws an anal-
ogy from English case law to support the conclusion that Coronado and its progeny should lead
invariably to union entity recognition. In Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soe'y of Ry. Servants,
[1901] A.C. 426, the House of Lords implied, from the British Trade Union Act of 1871, 34 & 35
VicT. c.31, that the union could be sued in its registered name and be held liable for its agents'
acts. Although the Act did not expressly so provide, it exempted unions from rules on restraint of
trade, gave them express power to own property, and required registration. In Bonsor v. Musi-
cians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104, the Lords disagreed on whether Taff Vale held that unions were
juridical persons by virtue of the statute, or whether it authorized only certain characteristics of
that status plus the procedural capability of suit. The author contends it is the former interpreta-
tion that is correct and was incorporated into Coronado. His conclusion, most importantly, is that
these English courts recognized that unions were not inherently incapable of juridical personality
and that statutes conferring rights and duties on unions necessarily imply otherwise.
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acting body . ... 88
Although Coronado's broad holding acknowledged the union's cor-
porate nature,89 the Court's reliance on statutory recognition cast doubt
on its factual existencef 0 The decision consequently did not deter the
states from continued reliance on the common law rule.91 As labor at-
tained greater economic power, the disparity between the union's legal
and functional status became more evident.92
The Wagner Act93 initially compounded the problems of union non-
entity by proscribing unfair employer labor practices without restrict-
ing employee activities.9 a But the declared purpose of the Act, to
encourage collective bargaining and to secure the benefits of group ac-
tion for the individual employee,95 compelled national recognition of
the union entity. In United States v. White,96 after noting that the Act
acknowledged the union's distinct and separate existence, the Supreme
Court held that a union official was prohibited from invoking the "per-
sonal" privilege against self-incrimination to withhold subpoenaed
88. 259 U.S. at 390-91.
89. See R. STEVENS, supra note 51, § 7, at 40-42 & n.72. But see Busby v. Electric Utilities
Employee Union, 323 U.S. 72, 76 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), on remand, 147 F.2d 865,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L, REV.
977, 1002 (1929); Frankfurter, The Coronado Case, 31 NEw REPUBLIC 328, 329 (1922).
90. See Sturges, supra note 75, at 398. At first, it was believed that Coronado established a
federal rule enabling all unincorporated associations to sue or be sued in their common name, see,
e.g., Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F.2d 412 (E.D. Ill. 1924), but a later Supreme Court
decision refused to extend the holding as far. See Moffatt Tunnel League v. United States, 289
U.S. 113 (1933) (holding, in effect, that statutory recognition was necessary). In response to
Coronado, Congress promulgated FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) which codifies this limited applicability
by allowing unincorporated associations to sue only to enforce a federal substantive right, unless
otherwise authorized by state law. See 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRAlCE 117.25, at 853-61 (2d ed.
1948).
91. In spite of the common name by which the union calls itself, the common treasury
out of which it finances its activities, the common officers by which it is governed-all of
them at war with the common law notion... [the Coronado case] has been rejected in
case after case ....
Witmer, Trade Union Liability The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40,
42 (1941). See, e.g., District 21, UMW v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 803, 277 S.W. 546, 549 (1925).
92. See Cole, supra note 82, at 29.
93. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
94. Many states reacted to the Wagner Act by enacting legislation designed to keep the un-
ions under some control. See Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go to War-On Labor Unions, 29
IowA L. REV. 148 (1944). One state went too far. See AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145
(1944) (Colorado statute requiring union incorporation held to be unconstitutional deprivation of
freedom of speech and assembly), noted in 58 HARv. L. REV. 1256 (1945).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
96. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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union records.97 The Court's opinion elaborated on the distinction be-
tween the organization and its members:
Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an institution which in-
volves more than the private or personal interests of its members. It repre-
sents organized, institutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual
activity. This difference is as well defined as that existing between indi-
vidual members of the union. The union's existence in fact, and for some
purposes in law, is as perpetual as that of any corporation, not being de-
pendent upon the life of any member. It normally operates under its own
constitution, rules and by-laws, which, in controversies between member
and union, are often enforced by the courts. The union engages in a mul-
titude of business and other official concerted activities, none of which
can be said to be the private undertakings of all the members.9"
Three years after White, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act,99 a
comprehensive legislative package designed to remedy the deficiencies
of earlier labor legislation'0° by distinguishing the rights and interests
of employers, employees, and labor organizations. °1 Specifically, sec-
tions 301 and 303 permitted unions to sue and be sued by employers
and other unions for violations of collective bargaining agreements and
other acts of economic coercion.10 2 For purposes of the Act, Congress
held the union fully responsible for the acts of its agents, and provided
97. Id. at 704-05. After noting that the privilege is a purely personal one which cannot be
utilized by or on behalf of any organization, see, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court stated:
The test. . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type or organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and
activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests
only. . . . Labor unions. . . clearly meet that test.
322 U.S. at 701.
98. Id. at 701-02. Coronado and White are said to have eliminated the old common law
nonentity rule. See Marshall v. ILWU Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1962). See also Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 1950) ("[Ihe entity
of the [union] is as much separate and apart from the individual members as that of a corporation
is from its stockholders."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951); Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers,
Inc., 261 App. Div. 181,24 N.Y.S.2d 860, aff'd, 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919 (1941) (union recog-
nized as an entity).
99. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-503, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970)).
100. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'don
other grounds, 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp.
656, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United Packing House Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 568
(N.D. IUl. 1948).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
102. Id §§ 185, 187.
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that money judgments would be enforceable only against the entity and
its assets, not those of its members. 103
Although Congress intended to personify the union as a jural en-
tity" the scope of union suability under Taft-Hartley was limited 05 to
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Regulation of the
union's internal affairs remained the province of largely inadequate
state laws."°l Despite the union's power to formulate and enforce the
rights and duties of those it represented, 0 7 Congress made no attempt
to ensure its accountability. Officers' fiduciary responsibilities, without
an enforcement mechanism, were insufficient to guarantee a demo-
cratic union, sensitive to the needs of minority members.'08 While
thus recognizing and protecting the employees' welfare during union
organizational drives," Taft-Hartley perpetuated the illusory identity
of union management and membership interests.
The Landrum-Griffin Act,' 10 enacted in 1959, removed any vestiges
of doubt regarding the union's independence from its members. Every
section of the Act acknowledged the labor organization's autonomous,
103. Id § 185(b).
104. See 93 CONG. REc. 7537 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft): "There is no reason in the world
why a union should not have the same responsibility that a corporation has. . . ." See Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,485 (1957) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Lincoln Mills has been
interpreted as authorizing the courts to fashion a federal common law to govern suits under the
National Labor Relations Act. See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962).
105. Forkosch, supra note 78, at 6. Section 302, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) provides for suit for
violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Section 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970) allows suit to
be brought for damages arising out of union unfair labor practices as proscribed in § 8(b)(4), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). The union cannot be sued under the Act for any other reason.
106. See notes 107-08 infra.
107. The Wagner Act, § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1976), imposed the principle of majority rule
on labor relations by giving the elected union the exclusive right to negotiate for all employees in
the bargaining unit. See Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) ("Congress
has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by
a legislative body....); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 829-31 (1960); Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law,
22 OHIO ST. L.. 4, 7 (1961).
108. See Cox, The Role ofLaw in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 610
(1959).
109. Employees' rights under § 7 of the Wagner Act were explicit only for the purpose of
joining a union and engaging in collective bargaining. Taft-Hartley amended § 7 and gave em-
ployees the right to refrain from union activities if they so desired.
110. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub, L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/4
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institutional nature.I" An employee bill of rights established guide-
lines for internal union democracy, including guarantees of equality,
freedom of speech and assembly, and due process in the course of
union imposed discipline.' 12  The Act required every union to adopt a
constitution and bylaws' 1 3 and voided any provision so adopted that
was inconsistent with the Act itself."I4 Prescribed election procedures
manifested the importance of employee free choice;1 5 an officer's
fiduciary duty, which ran to the entity and not to individuals, 16 re-
quired full disclosure of any financial interest in, or derived from, a
business whose employees were represented by the same union. 17 The
Act permitted a union member to sue, on behalf of the organization,
any officer for any breach of the statutory fiduciary obligations. 18 Fi-
nally, the Secretary of Labor had the authority to enforce or anticipate
violations of the Act's provisions through civil suit. 119
Although the Act's overall significance should not be underesti-
mated, 20  its importance for purposes of this discussion lies in its
definitive recognition of a union personality. The labor organization is
a creature of democracy,1 21 permitting workers to unite in their efforts
to confront management on employment issues. This collective strength
111. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402(d), 411, 415 (1970).
112. Id. § 411.
113. Id. § 431(a).
114. Id. § 411(b).
115. Id. § 48 1. This section establishes maximum terms of office, requires secret ballots, and
prohibits discrimination in favor of or against any candidate. The Secretary of Labor is authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to removal of officers if the union constitution or
bylaws do not provide adequate procedures.
116. Id. § 501. See Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 ofthe
LMRD,4, 52 MINN. L. REV. 437 (1967).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 432 (1970). The disclosure provisions are extensive, but exempt from cover-
age any bona fide investment in a security registered in accordance with federal law.
118. Id. § 501(b). This section has been compared to the right of a shareholder to bring a
derivative action against the corporate directors. See Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-
Grffin, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 267, 268 (1960). But see Kahn-Freund, supra note 107, at 5-6.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 440 (1970) gives the Secretary authority to bring an action against a person
who has violated or is about to violate any of the disclosure provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970)
permits the Secretary to seek court enforcement of election procedures upon the complaint of any
member. Other provisions include similar enforcement mechanisms.
120. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 851 (1960); Clark, supra note 116; Cox, supra note 107; Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union
Members, 48 GEo. L.J. 226 (1959); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and DisclosureAct of
1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195 (1960); Wollett, supra note 118.
121. See Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L.
Rv. 425, 431 (1949).
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places unparalleled economic leverage in the union which, if misused,
will have an adverse effect on millions of represented workers and,
consequently, on the entire nation. The maintenance of internal union
democracy, guaranteeing the rights of all workers, is necessary for the
sustenance of democracy itself. 22 It is appropriate, therefore, for Con-
gress to distinguish the individual employee from the powerful organi-
zational entity.
III. THE UNION IN BANKRUPTCY
Under the Bankruptcy Act, "unincorporated association" is not lim-
ited or equivalent to the term "corporation," but is included in the
Act's definition as a body having any of the powers and privileges of a
typical corporation. 1" The statute does not otherwise prescribe the req-
uisite characteristics of an association. There is reason to assume, there-
fore, that Congress, in the 1926 amendment, adopted the term's
common law definition.
In Coronado Coal, only four years earlier, the Supreme Court held
that unions were "associations" within the Sherman Act's use of the
term.' 24 Although it is uncertain whether Congress was aware of the
potential for union bankruptcy, legislators arguably recognized that ju-
dicial constricton of "unincorporated association" after Coronado
would include unions so that further expression was unnecessary. Ad-
mittedly, unlike other legislation during the same period, 125 the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not specifically include labor organizations. 26 Congress
nonetheless defined the "persons" entitled to the Act's benefits in
122. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 107, at 6.
123. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
124. 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1922). See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1970)); statutes noted in Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 386 n.1; Forkosch, supra note 78, at 7.
In In re Freight Drivers Local 600, 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Freight
Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978), Judge Wangelin noted
that, historically, union legislation often generated "loud political controversy." He found the
absence of such political debate "convincing evidence" that the 1926 amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act, see note 40 supra and accompanying text, were not intended to apply to labor organi-
zations. 432 F. Supp. at 1329. The logic underlying this conclusion is questionable; it is more
appropriate to discern congressional unawareness of the potential for union bankruptcy.
126. Judge Wangelin inferred from the lack of express union inclusion, support for his
finding that Congress did not consider unions "persons" under the Act. Id. at 1328. He acknowl-
edged, however, that the same reasoning might be applied to bring unions within the Act because
Congress specifically excluded certain other entities from the Act. Id. at 1328 n.6.
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broad, inclusive language, 27 drafting only in specific terms to exclude
certain entities from its coverage;' 28  unions were not specifically
excluded.
The Act includes "unincorporated associations" because they possess
corporate characteristics not common to individuals or partnerships;
unions, as a result of extensive federal legislation, share many of those
characteristics. 2 9 Federal law authorizes the union to sue and be sued,
enter into contracts, own and convey property, and incur debts. Rank
and file members elect officers who, like corporate managers, have the
power to effectively bind the organization. Government and industry
negotiate with union representatives to establish employment agree-
ments, reflecting both public and private sector recognition of the en-
tity's united strength. Administrative scrutiny of union officers
acknowledges the separation of managerial control from rank and file
and ensures employees' rights in internal union activities. That they
are sui generis, and resemble corporations in their methods of opera-
tion and use of power, is no longer questionable.13 0
Even if the union possesses the requisite corporate characteristics,
ACMI, if not limited to its facts, requires that an association maintain
a business purpose to be eligible for voluntary bankruptcy. 31 Although
Philadelphia Consistory correctly held that the nature of the "person"
in voluntary, unlike involuntary, proceedings was immaterial, 132
ACM! neglected this distinction. Labor unions fulfill the business pur-
pose requirement if, like the Tidewater Coal Exchange, they are orga-
127. "The five comprehensive classes of bodies, groups and businesses enumerated in the
clause [defining corporations] cover practically the whole range of private activities and enter-
prises, except those carried on by individuals as such and partnerships other than the specified
type." 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1.08, at 62 (14th ed. 1974).
128. Congress excluded "municipal, railroad, insurance or banking" corporations, see note
21 supra, because they were already subject to extensive state regulation. See Israel-British Bank
(London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976); Sovern,
supra note 30, at 172-82. Unions, as this Note indicates, were inadequately regulated under state
law.
129. In these days when associations of. . . workmen .... acting as a unit under a
constitution and by-laws, electing officers and controlling large funds, perform practi-
cally all the functions of a corporate entity and exercise a power for good or ill far
beyond that of individuals, there is every reason why Congress,. . . should be presumed
to have brought them within the reach of civil process.
Brief of Amici Curiae, UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 379 (1922).
130. Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 571,230 P.2d 71, 106
(1951).
131. See notes 60-69 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text.
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nized to provide members with commercial advantages.133 There is
admittedly no capital subscription or certificates evidencing beneficial
ownership, but the Act does not qualify the "unincorporated associa-
tion" as it does the partnership or trust.' 34 In Tidewater, the court held
that the Exchange's pursuit of business objectives satisfied any implied
business qualification; profit motive, for example, was unnecessary. 35
Labor unions thus satisfy ACMI's implied commercial restriction be-
cause they are in the business of collective bargaining for the benefit of
their members. 13
6
"Unincorporated associations" are entitled to the benefits of the
Bankruptcy Act. Courts construe the term broadly to include any group
of persons pursuing a common enterprise with sufficient corporate
traits to distinguish the association from a partnership. 137 Labor unions
are typically unincorporated associations consisting of individuals
organized to collectively bargain with their employers. The common
law anomaly of the union nonentity cannot survive modem realities 138
or the Act's inclusive provisions. 139 The labor union is a "corporation"
and, therefore, a "person" entitled to the benefits of bankruptcy.
Although unions may be entitled to the Bankruptcy Act's benefits,
postadjudication procedures may interfere with employee and union
rights and obligations under the federal labor laws. Irreconcilable dif-
ferences may indicate that bankruptcy is inappropriate even if the
133. See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
134. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
135. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
136. McNally v. Reynolds, 7 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Wash. 1934). By establishing a business
purpose for the union, the court in McNaly brought the union within the term "corporation,"
which required, for the statute in issue, a commercial basis.
137. See, e.g., Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924); Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson,
414 F.2d 1217, 1222 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); Local 4076, United Steel-
workers v. United Steelworkers of America, 327 F. Supp. 1400, 1403 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Yonce v.
Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 161 F. Supp. 178, 186 (W.D. Va. 1958).
138. Marshall v. ILWU, Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 783-84, 371 P.2d 987, 989, 22 Cal. Rptr.
211, 213 (1962) ("When these concepts [of nonentity status] are transferred. . . [to] labor unions
• . . reality is apt to be sacrificed to theoretical formalism."). See Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d
162, 193, 339 P.2d 801, 820 (1959) ("[N]o more can the rank and file individual workmen conduct
the business of a union than can the rank and file voters of a nation or state conduct its govern-
mental and business affairs."). See also Forkosch, supra note 78, at 28-29; Lester, Supra note 5, at
23; Sturges, supra note 75, at 404-05.
139. [O]n its face the Act indicates an intention to treat as a legal entity whatever associ-
ation may be treated as an entity in business contemplation, and that its apparent pur-
pose is to. . . overreach all technical barriers to adjudication in bankruptcy arising out
of the conceptions of legal entities or personalities.
McLaughlin, supra note 41, at 363.
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union will not otherwise survive. On the other hand, anticipating some
of the problems which arise from union bankruptcy tends to support
their eligibility. Courts, however, must proceed with little guidance
from Congress as to which policy should prevail. t4°
The societal interest in full employment may limit the bankruptcy
trustee's power to renounce a union's burdensome executory contracts.
After adjudication, creditors appoint a trustee to conserve and manage
the property of the bankrupt estate.'4 1 The Bankruptcy Act permits the
trustee taking title to the bankrupt's property to reject executory con-
tracts that are onerous or worthless to the estate.142 In the bankruptcy
of an employer who is party to an executory collective bargaining
agreement, labor and bankruptcy laws are virtually irreconcilable. 143
An insolvent employer should not necessarily maintain a full working
force or meet salary and benefit obligations when to do so would fur-
ther diminish the bankrupt estate. Industrial stability and full employ-
ment, however, may deserve precedence over creditors' rights. Because
of this equitable imbalance, courts permit the trustee of a bankrupt em-
ployer to reject collective bargaining agreements, but require him to
show proper motivation, financial disability, and the benefits of can-
cellation. 44 The trustee of a bankrupt union cannot meet this burden;
140. The National Labor Relations Act contains some references to bankruptcy. 29 U.S.C. §
165 (1970) provides for the labor law to prevail over the Bankruptcy Act's provision dealing with
the rights of employees to organize a debtor company, 11 U.S.C. § 672 (1970). In addition, the Act
is specifically applicable to trustees in bankruptcy. 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1970).
141. Bankruptcy Act §§ 44(a), 47, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72(a), 75 (1970).
142. Bankruptcy Act § 70(b), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). See Countryman, Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1973); Part II, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974).
The headnote to Part II defines an executory contract as "one under which the obligations of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."
Id. See, eg., Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916); Sunflower Oil
Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313 (1892); Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891); In re Lathrap, 61 F.2d
37 (9th Cir. 1932); Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359 (8th Cir. 1905).
143. Whether the Bankruptcy Act contemplates the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments has not been fully resolved. See Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Chapter XIArrangement Proceedings, 17 B. C. IND. & COMM. L. REv.192, 207-09 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Local 455, Int'l Assoc. of Iron Workers v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1975); Local 2746, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See
LaPenna, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK
UNIVERSITY TwENTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 169 (1976); Comment, Rejection
of Collective Bargaining 4greements by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 81 DICK. L. REv. 64 (1976); Note,
Bankruptcy and the Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 819
(1976); 28 VAND. L. REv. 1374 (1975); 22 WAYNE L. REv. 165 (1975).
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the agreement neither imposes any financial obligation on the union
nor would rejection benefit the estate..On the contrary, the union's
strength lies in its ability to continue serving its members, and main-
taining the contract assures employment stability.
The collective bargaining agreement's value to the estate may not be
an issue nor may the trustee exercise his option to reject if the contract
requires performance that is so "personal" to the bankrupt union that it
cannot be delegated to the trustee. 45 The National Labor Relations
Act guarantees employees the right to "bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choice." 146 Through free elections, employ-
ees choose the union they believe will best represent their interests in
contract negotiations and -in their subsequent relations with the em-
ployer. The collective bargaining agreement is a manifestation of this
choice and obligates the union to perform services which in effect re-
quire the "personal" skill of the employees' chosen representative. The
trustee, therefore, cannot fulfill the union's collective bargaining re-
sponsibilities nor would the labor laws permit him to do so.1 47 Title to
the contract, consequently, will not vest in the trustee because his sub-
stituted performance does not adequately fulfill the bankrupt union's
duty to perform.1 48
If the union remains in its representative capacity under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the trustee may assert a right to future dues,
perhaps the union's major asset,149 because he takes title to all of the
debtor's property including rights in action. 50 The employee's obliga-
145. See, e.g., In re Miller, 101 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938); In re Coleman, 87 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937); In re
Myers, 208 F. 407 (7th Cir. 1913).
146. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
147. Id § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) prohibits interference with rights guaranteed in § 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1970), including employee free choice in the selection of a bargaining representative.
148. A contract which cannot be assigned or transferred will not pass to the trustee. See
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(5) (1970). A "personal" contract cannot be assigned
because the other contracting party cannot be required to accept a substituted performance. See
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Paril), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407, 463-64
(1972). The other party may consent to the trustee's performance, but, where a collective bargain-
ing agreement is in issue, the validity of performance by anyone other than the employees' elected
representative is doubtful.
149. See P. TAFr, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONs 65 (1954).
150. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(6) (1970). See, e.g., Tuffy v. Nichols, 120
F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941); Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co.,
116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Irving Electrical Supply Co., 41 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1941),
aff'dsub nom. Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1942).
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tion to pay dues, however, arises from the union's continuous
fulfillment of its representative responsibilities. It is not, as the trustee
would assert, a vested right that accrues to the union as consideration
for its successful negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. It
is more closely analogous to wages or fees for future services which do
not pass to the trustee because the bankrupt acquires them after adjudi-
cation.lI' Without future dues income, moreover, the union's fresh start
would be unsuccessful, contravening both bankruptcy and labor law
policies. On the other hand, construing the trustee's power to avoid in-
terference with union functions would not disrupt bankruptcy proce-
dures and, at the same time, would preserve employee rights. Thus, the
practical effects of adjudication, by denying the trustee title to the col-
lective bargaining agreement or future dues, support the propriety of
union bankruptcy.
When courts determine that unions are "persons" under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, attention will focus on whether the local or the interna-
tional is the appropriate entity' 52 Local unions typically derive their
existence solely from the international constitution. 53 Although stat-
utes conferring entity status on labor organizations- for purposes of
suit, to elect officers, to enter into contracts- do not differentiate be-
tween the parent-international and the local, 54 union constitutions se-
verely limit local autonomy. The local may hold property in its own
name only for the purpose of effecting the international's objectives; if
the local voluntarily dissolves, all property reverts to the interna-
tional. 5" Local mismanagement is sufficient reason for the interna-
tional to insert a trustee to operate the local's affairs or initiate its
dissolution.1 6  But just as state law is irrelevant to the bankruptcy
151. See, e.g., Miller v. Wooley, 141 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 716 (1944); In
re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938); Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y v. Stewart, 12 F. Supp. 186 (W.D.S.C. 1935); In re Rashbaum, 4 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y.
1933).
152. In In re Freight Drivers Local 600, 432 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'dsub
om, Freight Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978), the
district court refused to reach this question after concluding that labor organizations were not, in
any event, amenable to the Bankruptcy Act.
153. See Rose, Relationship of the Local Union to the International Organization, 38 VA. L.
REV. 843 (1952).
154. See statutes cited in notes 102-19 supra.
155. See Cohn, The International and the Local Union, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 9 (1958); Comment, supra note 8, at
253.
156. See Cohn, supra note 155.
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definition of "person,' 157 union constitutions cannot deprive the local
of rights under federal law.- 8 A particular union and constitution may
necessitate closer scrutiny, for example, where the international's re-
sponsibility for the local's financial stability is carefully prescribed.
Otherwise, the local enjoys a sufficient degree of autonomy to incur
debts large enough to make voluntary bankruptcy desirable as a means
of survival.'59
An important tangential question is whether labor unions will disre-
gard their collective bargaining obligations, secure in the knowledge
that bankruptcy will provide relief.16° It is doubtful whether bank-
ruptcy provides a haven for an irresponsible union. To refuse adjudi-
cation to the honest debtor because of potential abuses by others begs
the question. Adjudication does not guarantee discharge of the judg-
ment debt; the Act deters bad faith to the extent it disallows the dis-
charge of debts arising from willful and wanton conduct. 161 Although
this provision was designed primarily to prevent discharge of malicious
tort liability,162 at least one court has found that the substance of the
underlying act, tort, or contract, is irrelevant to the question of willful-
ness.1 63 Nor should the consequences of bankruptcy be taken lightly.
The Act provides only minimal relief; debtors relinquish all but exempt
property when seeking adjudication, 1 and must wait six years before
157. See In re Missco Homestead Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 511, 518 (E.D. Ark. 1949), affd sub
nom. Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950). Accord, Burk-
Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); In re Wisconsin Coop. Milk Pool, 119 F.2d
999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941); In re Carthage Lodge 365, I.O.O.F., 230 F. 694
(N.D.N.Y. 1916); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1953). See
generaly Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942); Royal Indem. Co. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm'rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931).
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1970).
159. The Bankruptcy Judge in In re Freight Drivers Local 600, No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 12-
13 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 1, 1976), rev'don other grounds, 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affdsub
nom. Freight Drivers Local 600 v. Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978), found
that the local was sufficiently autonomous to qualify as a "person" under the Act.
160. Cf. Local 455, Int'l Assoc. of Iron Workers v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 698
(2d Cir. 1975) (in employer bankruptcy, union argued that employers would always seek bank-
ruptcy as an escape from burdensome collective bargaining agreements).
161. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8) (1970), prohibits the discharge of debts
incurred for "willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another."
162. See Bond v. Milliken, 134 Iowa 447, 109 N.W. 774 (1906); Clair v. Colmes, 245 Mass.
281, 139 N.E. 519 (1923). But see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (the "new opportu-
nity" afforded debtors includes freedom from many preexisting tort judgments).
163. See Rivera v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 233, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
164. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a) (1970).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/4
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a court will again grant a discharge. 165
The final policy analysis should give substantial weight to the impor-
tance of stable industrial-labor relations. Courts should construe the
Bankruptcy Act to avoid potential conflicts with labor policy.'6 6 The
union, as the duly elected representative of employee-members, should
enjoy the same opportunities open to other debtors. Permitting the in-
solvent union an adjudication in bankruptcy advances the purposes of
both regulatory schemes. If Congress, however, believes this will result
in industrial-labor instability, it is certainly within its discretion to alter
the law.
Glenn J Amster
165. Id. § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1970).
166. See Durand v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
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